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THE CASELOAD CONTROVERSY AND THE STUDY OF CRIMINAL COURTS
PETER F. NARDULLI*
INTRODUCTION
In the past several years there has been a growing
controversy over the impact of caseload pressure
upon the processing of criminal defendants. In
traditional criminal justice research, pervasive
"dysfunctioning" in the criminal courts system has
been attributed largely to caseload pressure. Some
criminal justice scholars, however, have recently
questioned the central role accorded caseload pres-
sure and have supported their arguments with
empirical evidence. While these recent studies suf-
fer from certain shortcomings, the questions which
they raise are extremely important and timely.
Furthermore, these studies have significant impli-
cations for both theory and policy. The demise of
caseload pressure as a central concept in the study
of criminal courts would leave a large gap in our
theoretical understanding of how these units func-
tion. If caseload pressures do not account for high
dismissal rates, pervasive plea bargaining, and the
weakening of the adversary system, what does? The
policy implications of this controversy are just as
significant. If increasing court resources-which
decrease caseload pressures-will not significantly
improve the operations of criminal courts, what
will?
Because of the significance of the controversy,
this article will briefly review the traditional role
of caseload pressure in the study of criminal courts,
as well as the recent studies attacking it. The
impact of variations in caseloads will then be reex-
amined from a somewhat different analytical per-
spective than that used by earlier researchers. The
results of this reexamination support the revisionist
thinking of scholars such as Heumann and Feeley,
and the implications of these findings for the study
of criminal courts will be discussed. Finally, an
attempt will be made to reconceptualize the role of
caseloads in light of an organizational perspective
on the operations of criminal courts. Two sets of
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data will be used to conduct a rough examination
of some of the ideas presented.
THE CASELOAD CONTROVERSY
Traditional Thought
Concern with the impact of caseloads upon crim-
inal court operations was evident as early as 1920.
In the Cleveland Crime Survey, perhaps the first sys-
tematic, empirical examination of American crim-
inal justice, Reginald Heber Smith observed that
heavy caseloads in the Municipal Court of Cleve-
land resulted in unnecessary dismissals of many
cases, as well as the occasional conviction of an
innocent defendant. Similar observations were
made in other crime surveys conducted during the
1920's. Arthur Lashley noted that Missouri prose-
cutors were so overworked that they could not
perform such rudimentary tasks as preparing in-
structions for juries, interviewing witnesses, and
attending coroner's inquests.2 In his summary anal-
ysis of the crime surveys for the Wickersham Com-
mission report, Alfred Bettman attributed the high
guilty rates observed in the surveys, in part, to the
"immense volume of cases thrown upon prosecu-
tors.",3 Increased criminal justice resources were an
integral part of the reform proposals advocated by
the crime survey researchers.
While criminal justice research was largely dor-
mant during the depression and war years, a re-
newed interest was evident by the mid-1950's. Dur-
ing this period, Samuel Dash, like Bettmen twenty
years earlier, saw a direct connection between case-
load pressure and guilty pleas.4 In Dash's view,
caseload pressures created an unhealthy state of
affairs because the substantial sentencing differen-
tials that were necessary to induce guilty pleas and
discourage trials led many innocent defendants to
plead guilty. Thus, caseload pressures indirectly
accounted for many substantive injustices. Donald
Newman and Albert Alschuler also saw plea bar-
I R. SMITH, CRIMINALJJUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 54 (1921).
2 Lashley, Preparation and Presentation of the State's Cases,
in THE MiSSOURI CRIME SURVEY 136 (1926).
3 Bettman, Criminal Justice Surveys Analysis, in 4 U.S.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 96 (1931).
4 Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of CriminalJustice, 46 ILL.
L. REv. 400 (1951).
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gaining as a practice which evolved to cope with
rising caseloads.5 Alschuler hypothesized that as
caseloads increased, sentencing concessions in
guilty plea cases likewise increased.
In one of the more extensive treatments of the
impact of caseloads upon courtroom operations
and outputs, Harry Subin contended that two of
the most significant consequences of caseload pres-
sure were that it led both to the compromise of
legal theory and to the substitution of speed for
care in courtroom deliberations.6 Subin- believed
that caseload pressure influenced the development
of a system which emphasized compromise rather
than confrontation and in which guilty pleas re-
placed trials as the primary mode of disposition.
He observed that large caseloads resulted in incon-
veniences to -witnesses, victims, and jurors who
suffered from long delays, inconsistent and super-
ficial treatment of defendants, strained relations
with police, because their cases were being mishan-
dled, and reduced courtroom dignity. In sum, he
found that the problem of volume was pervasive.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice echoed many of
Subin's points.
A Restatement
Underlying these sometimes rather disparate ex-
pectations concerning the effects of caseload pres-
sure upon courtroom operations is an implicit, but
generally shared, model of courtroom processes.
This model can best be explicated and analyzed
through the introduction of the notion of disposi-
tional strategy. The term "dispositional strategy"
can best be conceptualized as a plan or design for
handling workloads in criminal courts (i.e., for
disposing of cases). Similar plans operate in most
organizations7 and their role is to foster the trans-
formation of inputs into outputs. They specify
what tasks to perform on what inputs in order to
5 Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of
Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 780 (1956);
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968).
6 H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN
COURT-THE PROCESSING OF SERIOUS CRIMINAL CASES IN
THE D.C. COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS (1966).7The notion of dispositional strategy is an adaptation
of James Thompson's concept of an organization's tech-
nology. For his development of the role of technology in
the study of organizations, see J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN ACTION (1967). The applicability of this concept
in the study of criminal courts is developed at some
length in P. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN OR-
CANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978).
produce the desired type or mix of outputs. They
also specify how the various tasks are to be per-
formed.
Incorporating the notion of dispositional strat-
egy, Diagram 1 is a loose, somewhat simplified
representation of the traditional researcher's
model.8 Within the model it is presumed that,
under optimal conditions (i.e., no caseload stress),
the procedures used by criminal courts to process
cases are those dictated by Anglo-Saxon notions of
due process and embodied in the formal rules of
criminal procedure. These factors were determi-
native of a court's dispositional strategy because of
the importance of what might be termed the "legal
man assumption" in traditional criminal court
thinking. The legal man assumption is the belief
that the legal profession develops people who are
socialized to respond in their official capacities to
legal norms and professional canons of ethics. Un-
like the economic man, the legal man is not an
omniscient being motivated by his own self inter-
est.9 This assumption plays a crucial role in tradi-
tional thought concerning the impact of caseload
pressure upon courtroom operations because of its
relationship to another basic assumption. That
assumption is that most criminal courts are oper-
ating under severe caseload stress (i.e., beyond op-
timal levels), given their present level of resources.
This caseload pressure makes it impossible for crim-
inal justice officials (judges, prosecutors, and de-
BOddly enough, perhaps the most explicit statement
of some of the relationships expressed in Diagram I can
be found in the preface to A. BLUMBERO, CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE Xi (1967):
Intolerably large caseloads, which must be handled
with limited resources and personnel, potentially.
subject the participants in the court community to
harsh scrutiny from appellate courts and other pub-
lic and private sources of condemnation. Thus there
is an almost irreconcilable conflict: intense pressures
to process large numbers of cases, on the one hand,
and the stringent ideological and legal requirements
of "due process of law," on the other. The dilemma
is frequently resolved through bureaucratically or-
dained short cuts, deviations, and outright rule
violations by members of the court, from judges to
stenographers, in order to meet production norms.
This is peculiar because Blumberg does not belong to the
same intellectual tradition as most of the researchers
described above. He does not really adhere to the legal
man assumption (to be discussed in the text), nor does he
believe that increased criminal justice resources are a
panacea for criminal court problems. Given the thrust of
his arguments, the centrality he attributes to caseload
pressure is puzzling.
9 For an extended discussion of the role of the legal
man assumption in the study of criminal courts see P.








fense counsel) to handle cases in accordance with
the formal requirements of due process; although
the legal man assu'mption indicates that they
would if they could.
Within this model as caseloads increase beyond
optimal levels, speed and compromise begin to
displace due process values as determinants of a
court's dispositional strategy. It is this displace-
ment, caused by caseload pressures, which accounts
for the observed dysfunctioning in criminal courts.
The prevalence of the legal man assumption leads
to the belief that this dysfunctioning can be curbed
by increasing criminal court resources. As resources
increase and caseload pressures decrease, due proc-
ess values would begin to displace administrative
values in the processing of criminal cases. This
expectation formed the basis for most traditional
programs of criminal court reform.'
0
The sentencing decision can be used to illustrate
the dynamics of the traditional model. During
periods when caseload stress was not significant,
the criteria embodied in the sentencing decision
would be expected to be largely reflective of con-
siderations consistent with contemporary notions
" This is, of course, an admittedly oversimplified view
of traditional thought. No one, for example, believed that
all of the ills plaguing criminal courts could be resolved
by reducing caseloads. While such a reduction was ex-
pected to eliminate the evils associated with such things
as plea bargaining and delay, it was not expected to do
too much about the problems caused by incompetent
judges or racial discrimination. Moreover, Diagram I
could be made significantly more complex. One could,
for example, note that increased caseloads were expected
to lead to increased delays which, in turn, would cause
problems implementing the prevailing dispositional strat-
egy. Thus increased delays would be expected to have
an indirect effect upon outputs. These qualifications
notwithstanding, the above analysis captures the essence
of traditional thinking about criminal courts and is ade-
quate for present purposes.
of due process. Examples of such criteria would be
the seriousness of the case, the defendant's peno-
logical needs, and his conduct since his arrest.
However, as caseloads increased beyond optimal
levels, other types of criteria would be expected to
become important. As speed and compromise be-
gin to displace due process values, such factors as
the mode of conviction (guilty plea, bench trial,
jury trial) and the extent of the defendant's com-
pliance with informal courtroom norms would ex-
pectantly become important in the determination
of sentences. Moreover, as continued increases in
workloads are experienced, the displacement of due
process values would be accentuated. Continued
increases in workloads would put prosecutors in
increasingly weaker bargaining positions. Thus, the
sentencing- differential between guilty pleas and
jury trials would, for example, become larger.
The Work of Heumann and Feeley
As is evident from this brief summary and elab-
oration of traditional thought, the impact of case-
load pressure upon the operations of criminal
courts was considered to be pervasive. But, despite
the almost sacrosanct position which this concept
has enjoyed for almost half a century, some con-
temporary criminal justice scholars have become
increasingly skeptical. In separate works, Milton
Heumann and Malcolm Feeley have recently chal-
lenged some of the traditional expectations con-
cerning the effects of caseload pressure using quan-
titative and qualitative analyses to support their
arguments.
In studying plea bargaining in the Connecticut
Superior Courts, Heumann conducted three anal-
yses to demonstrate that trial rates do not increase
with reductions in caseload pressure." First, he
1 Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure,
9 L. & Soc'y REv. 515 (1975).
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presented the aggregate trial rates in the courts
(which handle misdemeanor and minor felony
cases) for most years from 1880 to 1959, and found
no marked decrease in trial rates. Second, he sep-
arated the various Superior Courts on the basis of
average number of cases disposed of each year and
compared trial rates for low-volume and high-vol-
ume courts during the same period. He found that
after 1905 there were no systematic differences in
trial rates between the two and no systematic de-
crease over the years. His third analysis compared
trial rates for each Superior Court before and after
a jurisdictional change. The change allowed the
transfer to Connecticut Circuit Courts of some
minor felony cases which could previously be han-
dled only by the Superior Court. Although this
jurisdictional change was unaccompanied by a
reduction in manpower, there were again no sys-
tematic differences in trial rates.
Feeley, like Heumann, did a macro-level analysis
of Connecticut lower level trial courts. 12 He com-
pared aggregated statistics on courtroom outputs
in a high-volume court with those in a low-volume
court. Feeley found no significant differences in
trial rates, average number of motions filed, release
statistics, bail structure, and sentencing structure.
He did not compare guilty plea rates per se, but he
did examine differences in guilty pleas to reduced
charges. Here he found a markedly higher rate of
such guilty pleas in the high-volume court. When
only felony cases were considered, the differences
were even greater. Although Feeley did not treat
conviction rates explicitly, it appears from his data
that the low-volume court had a significantly
higher conviction rate than the high-volume court.
Feeley also reported that decorum in the low-vol-
ume court seemed to be better than in the high-
volume court. However, because judges in the low-
volume court spent less time on the bench (an
average of one hour per day) than judges in the
high-volume court (an average of about three
hours), court time per case was about the same in
both jurisdictions.
While there are significant differences between
the works of Heumann and Feeley, the thrust of
both is similar: caseload pressure does not have the
pervasive impact which has long been attributed
to it. Both studies are ground-breaking efforts be-
cause they challenge some of the most basic and
widely held beliefs concerning the operations of
criminal courts. However, while Heumann's work
,2 M. Feeley, The Effects of Heavy Caseloads (paper
presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the America;
Political Science Association Sept. 2-5, 1975).
is consistent with the proposition that the demise
of the adversary system (reflected in average trial
rates) is not a recent phenomenon, it cannot be
said that either work is a valid examination of
traditional expectations concerning the effects of
caseload pressure on courtroom processes.
Several rather fundamental methodological
problems prevented such an examination. For ex-
ample, Heumann's first analysis did not deal with
caseload statistics. He regressed (in a non-technical
sense) aggregate trial rates with yearly changes, not
with a measure of system caseload adjusted for
manpower. Hence, this analysis does not speak to
the relationship between caseload pressure and
trial rates unless one presumes that the caseload
per judge has steadily increased over the years.
However, there is no justification for such a pre-
sumption. Indeed, the reverse may be true. In the
1929 Illinois Crime Survey, for example, it was
reported that seven criminal court trial judges
handled 5,253 cases (an average caseload per judge
of 750).3 In 1972, however, sixteen judges in the
criminal division of the Circuit Court handled only
4,281 cases (an average caseload per judge of 267).14
This calculation represents more than a fifty per-
cent decline in caseload per judge. In 1975, Feeley
also presented indirect support for this point by
noting that in 1919 Cleveland judges handled an
average caseload of 11,999, while the judges had
average caseloads of 7,300 and 4,500 in the Con-
necticut courts he studied. In light of these figures,
it does not appear that the presumptions underly-
ing Heumann's first analysis are wholly valid.
There are similar measurement problems in
Heumann's second analysis where he attempted to
compare trial rates of low- and high-volume courts
over time. Instead of categorizing courts by average
caseload adjusted by manpower, he categorized
them in terms of average number of dispositions per
year, unadjusted for manpower. For this analysis
to be meaningful, though, one would have to as-
sume that manpower (number of judges, for ex-
ample) in the high-volume courts was not signifi-
cantly different from that in the low-volume courts.
I' ILL. ASSOC. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS
CRIME SURvEY 201, 207 (1929).
14 The 1972 figures were computed from data included
in Statistical Report: Bonds, Cases, Fees, Fines, and Costs;
December 1st to November 30th 1970-73, at 5 (unpublished
report by M. J. Danaher, Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Cook County). The data in this report had to be adjusted
to be comparable to the 1927 data because they dealt
with the number of indictments handled, not the number
of defendants. The average number of indictments per
defendant in 1972 was computed, and this figure was
used to adjust the data contained in the clerk's report.
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One would also need to assume that there was a
very strong correlation between docket size (number
of cases pending) and number of dispositions, and
that this relationship did not vary with the size of
the docket or over time. However, no support was
given for any of these assumptions.
Heumann's third piece of evidence (a change in
jurisdiction unaccompanied by systematically dif-
ferent trial rates) is his strongest, but it too is not
without problems. First, he again did not docu-
ment differences in caseloads before and after the
change in jurisdiction. Instead, he only docu-
mented differences in outputs. However, even more
serious methodological problems are present. With
the change in jurisdiction in the Connecticut court
system came changes in the types of cases handled
by the Superior Courts. If the types of cases han-
dled by the Superior Courts after the change in
jurisdiction had systematically lower trial rates in
the pre-change period, then the lack of a change in
aggregate trial rates may reflect a change in court-
room procedures. The reduction in caseload (if it
in fact occurred) may have been reflected in mod-
ified decision rules for handling cases, as traditional
researchers would have expected. These modifica-
tions may not have been reflected in aggregate trial
rates because of changes in the characteristics of
the cases handled in the post-change period.
Feeley's work does not suffer from the measure-
ment problems inherent in that of Heumann. Fee-
ley did employ a system-level measure of caseload
pressure adjusted for manpower, rather than an
unadjusted measure of aggregate level of disposi-
tions. However, because he compared aggregate
outputs without controlling for differences in in-
puts, Feeley cannot make valid inferences concern-
ing the impact of different levels of caseload pres-
sure upon the internal court procedures used to
process cases. A second point is also relevant here.
Unlike Heumann, who compared the impact of a
change in jurisdiction upon outputs within a given
system, Feeley compared outputs in two different
jurisdictions. This is methodologically troublesome
because, even if meaningful differences in outputs
could be determined, without further analysis one
could not make valid inferences concerning the
effect of differences in caseload pressure upon the
internal processes which produced those outputs.
Differences in the court systems' environment or
immediate setting may account for whatever dif-
ferences or similarities are observed. For example,
differences in community expectations as to the
handling of certain types of cases (such as traffic
cases, marijuana cases, and rape cases) or the ap-
propriateness of different modes of disposition
(guilty plea or trial) may account for whatever
differences or similarities were observed quite in-
dependent of differences in caseload pressure.
THE IMPACT OF CASELOAD PRESSURE REEXAMINED:
A MICRO PERSPECTIVE
The criticisms of Heumann and Feeley really
should not be over-emphasized; their theoretical
analyses are still sound. The problem is that the
methodological shortcomings noted above give rise
to certain questions concerning the inferences that
they, and others, draw from their empirical anal-
yses. Despite these questions their work does cast
considerable doubt upon traditional expectations
concerning the effects of changes in caseload pres-
sure. This article seeks to build upon their work by
examining the.effects of changes in caseloads from
a somewhat different analytical perspective, a mi-
cro-perspective. To do this a sample of 816 adult
felony cases disposed of during 1972-73 in the
Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois was used. 5 Over this period of
time monthly caseloads of Chicago judges varied
considerably. Moreover, extensive data were avail-
able on each case in the sample. These data per-
mitted an examination of the impact of variations
in caseload pressure upon various facets of court-
room operation while controlling for various case
level attributes such as seriousness of the crime,
defendant characteristics, and evidentiary factors.
Those facets of courtroom operations to be exam-
ined include the guilty plea decision, the sentence
in guilty plea cases, and the decision to pursue a
case to trial.'6
'5 The data base to be used here is the Chicago trial
sample of cases used by J. EISENSTEIN & H. JAcOB, FELONY
JusTicE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL
COURTS (1977). Of the 816 cases in the entire data base,
596 were the result of a random sample. The other cases
were derived from a systematically selected observational
sample. The merged sample of cases is a representative
sampling of the types of cases handled by the trial courts
during the period of this study (1972-73). The data cover
Chicago cases only.
16 A few comments are in order concerning the decision
to pursue a case to trial. In Chicago, during the period of
this study, the preliminary hearing courts engaged in
extensive screening. Only about 12% or 13% of all felony
cases initiated were sent to trial courts, and were the
objects of this study. Thus, the presumption of guilt was
quite heavy in trial court cases. One consequence of this
is that, in most cases, little thought was initially given to
a dismissal. Rather, efforts were generally made to ne-
gotiate a guilty plea. But in many cases, about 44%,
negotiations failed. It is in these cases that the decision
had to be made to dismiss a case or pursue it to trial.
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Given the nature of traditional thought, a neg-
ative relationship would be expected between case-
loads and sentences in guilty plea cases and be-
tween caseloads and the decision to pursue a case
to trial (scored 0 if case is dismissed and 1 if the
case is pursued to a trial). A positive relationship
would be expected between caseloads and guilty
pleas (scored 0 if the case was not disposed of by a
guilty plea and 1 if it was). When caseload pressure
is high, prosecutors would be expected to offer
more sentencing concessions more easily, resulting
in lower sentences in guilty plea cases. On the other
hand, as caseloads increase, prosecutors and judges
would be expected to exert more pressure on de-
fendants and their attorneys to secure guilty pleas.
This added pressure, in conjunction with the ex-
pected lower sentences, would result in higher
guilty plea rates. Finally, as caseloads increased,
fewer cases would be pursued to trial because
prosecutors would not have the necessary resources
to conduct the additional trials.
Caseload Measures
To gauge the effect of variations in caseload
pressure two indicators of caseloads were used. The
first caseload variable was the number of cases on
a given judge's docket in each of the twenty-four
months included in the sample.1 7 There was a
significant amount of variation observed in this
variable both across judges and over time. For
example, the lowest caseload observed for a full-
time judge was 109, and the highest was 559. The
mean caseload was 282 cases. The lowest mean
caseload for a full-time judge was 157, and the
highest was 407. The second caseload variable was
the total number of cases pending in the entire
17 Like the next caseload variable to be discussed, this
variable is only a crude measure of caseload pressure. It
equates a simple unauthorized use of a weapon case with
a complex murder case. Obviously, a judge with one
hundred murder cases is laboring under much more
severe caseload pressure than a judge with one hundred
weapons cases. In reality, however, such gross disparities
in judges' dockets do not exist (at least not in Chicago for
this study). What is crucial to the analysis, however, is
the assumption that the complexity of cases does not
systematically vary with caseload volume to any great
extent. That is, the relative proportion of different types
of cases remains relatively constant over changes in case-
load volume. One last point should be noted with regard
to this measure of caseload pressure. In Chicago, certain
prosecutors, public defenders, clerks, and support person-
nel, are permanently assigned to each judge. Hence a
judge's caseload in a given month is the same as those of
the prosecutors and clerks. Therefore, this is a fairly
general measure of caseload pressure.
criminal trial court system in each of the twenty-
four months under consideration, and there was a
substantial amount of variation in it. While the
number of full-time judges remained constant at
sixteen, the monthly caseload for the entire system
varied from a low of 3,786 cases pending to a high
of 6,120. The mean was 5,030 cases.
The system caseload variable is important to
include in any analysis of the effects of caseload
pressure because, while a given judge's docket
might be low in a given month, the system's overall
volume may be high. This system-level caseload
pressure may, in turn, be reflected in pressure
applied to individual judges by the presidingjudge
of the Criminal Division who functions as the
administrative head and whose job it is to "get
things moving." During the time of this study, the
presiding judge would send weekly disposition
sheets to each judge which listed, by courtroom,
the business transacted in the preceding week
(number of trials, number of dismissals, defendants
sent to the penitentiary, total number of disposi-
tions, etc.). Whether more subtle forms of pressure
were used is not known. To determine whether
such systemic pressures combined with pressures
emanating from a judge's docket to affect disposi-
tional procedures, an interaction term involving
both caseload variables was used in each analysis.
Data Analysis
To analyze the effect of variations in caseload
pressures, while controlling for other important
factors which are not relevant for the purposes of
this analysis,18 multiple regression analysis was
used." Because of space constraints, only informa-
I8 In the limited space of this article it is not possible
to discuss the types of factors affecting each of the three
decisions being analyzed here. Needless to say, the types
of factors affecting each varies considerably. A full dis-
cussion of the relevant variables, as well as the procedures
used to measure them, has been presented elsewhere. See
P. NARDULLI, supra note 7, chs. V-VIII.
19 It should be noted that the use of dummy dependent
variables, such as the pursued and guilty plea variables,
formally violates certain basic assumptions underlying
multiple regression analysis. It is assumed, for example,
that the variance around every value of the dependent
variable is constant. This cannot hold true for dummy
variables except in the unusual case where the proportion
of cases in one category equals the proportion of cases in
the other category (i.e., fifty percent of the cases are
coded 0 on the dependent variable and fifty percent of
the cases are coded 1). But, while this is a formal assump-
tion underlying multiple regression analysis, it is also
known that, except in extreme cases, a violation of it is




SUMMARY OF QUANT TATIVE RESULTS FOR THE JUDGE CASELOAD VARIABLE
Increase in
Explained F Value of
Dependent N Simple Variance Due Partial B Increase inDepedentBivariate
Variable Cola to Addition Coefficient Explanatory
rreaton of Caseload Power
Variable
Guilty plea decision 410 .10 .000 .000 .006
(0 = no guilty plea;
= guilty plea)
Sentence in guilty 275 .19 .001 .02 .73
plea case
(scored in months)




SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS FOR THE SYSTEM CASELOAD VARIABLE
Increase in
Explained F Value of
Dependent N Simple Variance Due Partial B Increase inDepenent N Bivariate
Variable Correlation to Addition Coefficient Explanatory
of Caseload Power
Variable
Guilty plea decision 410 -. 02 .000 .000 .003
(0 no guilty plea;
I = guilty plea)
Sentence in guilty 275 .05 .001 -. 002 .68
plea case
(scored in months)
Decision to pursue 241 -. 12 .003 -. 02 .87
(0 dismissal;
I = trial)
tion relevant to the impact of the caseload variables
will be reported. Tables I and 2 summarize the
cian-statistician, writes in his ANALYSIS OF BINARY DATA
16 (1970) that:
... it is known that quite appreciable changes in
var (Y) induce only a modest loss of efficiency.
Further, at least in the range, say, 0.2 S 00i :5 0.8,
the function G,(l - 8i). changes relatively little.
Therefore, within this range, there is unlikely to be
a serious loss of efficiency arising from the changes
in var (Y1).
Empirical studies have shown that other more compli-
cated techniques which are formally more appropriate
for use with dummy dependent variables produce very
similar results. See, e.g., Gunderson, Retention of Trainees: A
Study with Dichotomous Dependent Variables, 2 J. ECONOMET-
Rics 79 (1974). Gunderson compares regression analysis
with logit analysis, probit analysis, and other sophisti-
cated forms of analysis designed for dichotomous depen-
dent variables.
Given these findings, the problems associated with the
use of other methods (some of which are noted in Gun-
impact of the two caseload variables; neither vari-
able contributed any statistically significant ex-
planatory power to the analysis of the three depen-
dent variables examined. The probability of a
guilty plea occurring did not vary with caseload
pressure, nor did the sentence given in a guilty plea
derson), and the greater familiarity of multiple regression(on the part of the author as well as most readers)
multiple regression analysis was chosen over other meth-
ods. There is a 56-44 split in the guilty plea variable used
here and a 70-30 split in the pursued variable. Thus,
both clearly fall within the 20-80 split which Cox dis-
cusses, and the plea variable comes very close to the ideal
50-50 split. In choosing multiple regression with a
dummy dependent variable it is felt that this work falls
well within conventional modes of statistical analysis in
the social sciences. Other recent uses of this technique
include Wright, Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The
Southern Wallace Votes, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 497 (1977);
and Mason, Change in U.S. Women's Sex Role Attitudes,
1964-74, 41 AM. Soc. REv. 573 (1976).
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case. The decision to pursue a case to trial did not
appear to be affected by caseload. In no instance
was the interaction term involving these variables
insignificant.20
Because the results were not consistent with tra-
ditional thought, further analyses were undertaken.
It was found that the judge's or system's caseload
in the month prior to the month of disposition had
no statistically significant effect upon decision
making. It was also found that caseload in the
month after a case's disposition had no statistically
significant effect upon decision making. This vari-
able was included because cases reflected in the
next month's figures were received by a judge in
the previous month. For example, ajudge was able
to anticipate caseloads in November during Octo-
ber because he received new cases throughout Oc-
tober which were reflected in November statistics.
An aggregate judge caseload variable was con-
structed by adding the judge caseload variable for
the three-month period surrounding the case's dis-
position (T - 1, T, T + 1). The aggregated
caseload variable also had no significant impact.
Discussion
The rather meager impact of caseload pressure
on the decisions examined here leads to several
questions. First, given the centrality of caseload
pressure in the traditional criminal court literature,
why does variation in caseloads not significantly
affect three of the most important aspects of crim-
inal court operations? On its face, the position of
traditional researchers seems eminently reasonable.
When a system is operating at or beyond capacity,
increases in workloads would necessarily appear to
result in changes in the procedures used to process
cases. The key to this dilemma lies in the assump-
tion of traditional researchers that most criminal
justice systems are working at or beyond their
20 The N's reported in Tables I and 2 differ from the
816 reported earlier for a variety of reasons. Of the 816
cases, only 674 were disposed of during the period of this
study and no dispositional information was available for
the remaining 142. The sentencing analysis included only
cases convicted by means of a guilty plea. The pursued
analysis excluded all guilty plea cases because the concern
there was with what happened to cases not negotiated.
All 674 cases were relevant only for the guilty plea
decision. Only 410 cases are reported there because of a
missing value problem with one of the control variables.
Further analyses showed, however, that the effect of the
caseload variables, as well as the other control variables,
was essentially the same for the 674 cases as for the 410.
Hence, the smaller subsample with the more reliable set
of information was used.
capacity. If one were to view criminal court case-
loads in light of the resources necessary to process
them in a manner consistent with the ideals em-
bodied in the adversary model of criminal justice,
one could legitimately argue that courts are expe-
riencing severe stress. Most contemporary criminal
courts, however, do not process cases using decision
rules aimed at maximizing due process values.
The court system in Chicago at the time of this
study was clearly not due process oriented. Nine
months of courtroom observations supported by
quantitative analyses revealed the importance of
administrative criteria in the performance of many
tasks. Guilty pleas dominated the conviction pro-
curement process, accounting for about eighty per-
cent of all trial court convictions. Moreover, there
were marked disparities in sentences given after a
guilty plea and those given after a trial. A defense
attorney's relationship with other members of the
courtroom team had a significant effect upon his
client's sentence in guilty plea cases. Additionally,
in trial cases convicted defendants who violated
informal trial court norms by using delaying tac-
tics, raising legal motions, or invoking jury trials,
were routinely given markedly more severe sen-
tences than other defendants. Special scheduling
considerations were given to a select group of pri-
vate defense attorneys by courtroom regulars.
These considerations were returned in kind. In
sum, the clubhouse atmosphere in the trial courts
of Chicago led to a dispositional process which
facilitated the expeditious handling of caseloads.2'
If criminal court resources are examined in light
of the procedures actually used to process cases,
one might justifiably contend that many criminal
court systems have considerable excess capacity.
Clearly there was much idle time in the trial courts
of Chicago. In an average day most judges spent
no more than two to three hours on the bench and
did very little in their chambers after court was
recessed.22 Moreover, throughout the two year pe-
riod examined, the average number of dispositions
each month for each of the sixteen courtrooms in
Cook County was twenty-one, or about one per
2'The empirical analyses which support these asser-
tions are reported in P. NARDULLI, supra note 7, chs. VII
& VIII.
2 This observation was confirmed by a newspaper
exposi on the Chicago courts which was done at about
the same time the study was in progress. Investigators
noted that trial court judges spent an average of 2.75
hours per day on the bench, and another 1.5 in chamber
activity. Chicago Sun Times, January 20, 1974.
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working day.23 This norm of a "disposition per
day" is all the more remarkable when it is realized
that during this time period approximately seventy
percent of the dispositions were guilty pleas or
dismissals. The empirical findings reported in
Tables I and 2 are consistent with the notion of
excess capacity. Within the range of variation ob-
served, the criteria used to make the basic decisions
analyzed earlier did not systematically vary with
changes in caseload pressure. This would be ex-
pected if changes in caseload did not lead to stress
in the implementation of prevailing dispositional
procedures.
To suggest that variations in caseload pressure
do not affect basic criminal court tasks because of
excess capacity, generated by heavy reliance upon
expeditious dispositional procedures, highlights a
second shortcoming in traditional thought. Because
of traditional researchers' adherence to the legal
man assumption, excess capacity and administra-
tively oriented dispositional procedures were mu-
tually exclusive phenomena. Within their model,
due process values were displaced by values such
as speed and compromise only because of caseload
pressure. The "legal men" who processed criminal
cases would, if they could, adhere to the ideals
embodied in lofty notions of due process and artic-
ulated in the formal rules of criminal procedure.
The observation that reductions in caseload pres-
sure do not result in the reemergence of due process
criteria emphasizes the void in criminal court
thinking left by the demise of caseload pressure as
a central concept. If variations in caseload pressure
do not affect the nature of the criteria employed in
making basic criminal court decisions, what are the
determinants of these decision rules? What ac-
counts for the discrepancy between the decision
rules actually employed in criminal courts and
those which would be employed in an adversary
system of criminal justice? Moreover, if increased
resources will not enhance the significance of due
process considerations in the processing of criminal
cases, what will?
CASELOADS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The void can be filled by the same, rather recent
intellectual developments which led insightful
criminal justice scholars such as Heumann and
Feeley to question initially the caseload hypotheses.
23 This figure was computed from official reports com-
piled by and furnished by the Cook County Clerk of the
Circuit Court's Office-Criminal Division.
These developments speak to the legal man as-
sumption and concern the emergence of organiza-
tional approaches to the study of criminal courts.
While the works which are commonly acknowl-
edged as organizationally oriented studies of crim-
inal courts constitute a rather disparate body of
literature, common to them is at least one basic
thesis.2 That is the general contention that factors
emanating from the collective efforts of judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel to pursue common
interests have important consequences for the pro-
cessing of criminal cases. Further, to abstract a bit
from what has been argued in the studies, these
common interests can be defined as the shared
desire to process cases expeditiously. This shared
desire is important because those who share it enjoy
a virtual monopoly of power within the courtroom
setting. This state of affairs leads to the develop-
ment of a dispositional strategy that is reflective of
the interests of the courtroom elite and which
emphasizes the expeditious handling of cases.
This situation is not unique. James Thompson
contends, for example, that coalitions are very apt
to emerge in organizational settings where individ-
uals are vested with discretionary power and where
the results of increased power due to the formation
of a coalition can be shared.25 That is, in fact, what
has transpired in many American criminal courts,
Chicago being a case in point. Because the benefits
of a dispositional strategy oriented toward the ex-
peditious processing of cases can be shared by
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, they
have been able to maintain a resilient coalition
which is a viable force within the dispositional
process.
While internal factors such as the interests of the
courtroom elite must be considered when attempt-
ing to understand the operations of criminal courts,
external constraints upon the ability of these indi-
viduals to pursue their own interests cannot be
ignored. Environmental considerations must play
an integral role in any organizational analysis of
criminal courts. The importance and role of envi-
ronmental considerations in the operations of or-
ganizations is perhaps best stated by Thompson:
2'These works included A. BLUMBERO, supra note 8; J.
EISENsTEIN & H. JAcon, supra note 15; Cole, The Decision
to Prosecute, 4 L. & Soc'y REv. 331 (1973); Feeley, Two
Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational Per-
spective, 7 L. & Soc'y REv. 407 (1972); Mileski, Courtroom
Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5
L. & Soc'y REv. 473 (1971); and Mohr, Organizations,
Decisions, and Courts, 10 L. & Soc'y REv. 621 (1976).
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We and others have emphasized the coalitional
nature of complex organizations, but always in
terms of agreements among individual members,
each having something to contribute and each re-
ceiving something in exchange. There is, however,
a larger sense of configuration, which we will refer
to as co-alignment.
Perpetuation of the complex organization rests
on an appropriate co-alignment in time and space
not simply of human individuals but of streams of
institutionalized action. Survival rests on the coal-
ignment of technology and task environment....
To summarize, if the legal man assumption is
rejected and it is acknowledged that criminal jus-
tice personnel, like most individuals, attempt to
maximize self interests, then insights into the op-
erations of criminal courts can be gained by view-
ing the system from an organizational perspective.
While the interests of the court's dominant coali-
tion have a strong impact upon the structure of its
dispositional strategy, environmental considera-
tions are also important. Thus, a court's disposi-
tional strategy, within a given jurisdiction, might
be viewed as largely the result of the tension between
internal and external factors.27
If Diagram I were modified to incorporate these
observations it would look like Diagram 2.
This reconceptualization is important because it
has significant implications for understanding the
role of caseload pressure. Moreover, it is clear that
these implications vary depending upon whether
the resources of the court system being examined
are over or under utilized. If, considering the pro-
cedures actually used to process cases, the court
system is working at or beyond optimal levels, the
26 Id. at 147.
27 This general perspective is developed in much more
detail in P. NARDULLI, supra note 7, ch. III.
expectations concerning the effects of increases in
caseloads would not be much different from those
put forward by traditionalists. Increases would
probably bring about bargaining concessions, re-
sulting in lower sentences in guilty plea cases and
higher guilty plea rates. They would also probably
result in a reduction in the likelihood that a given
case would be pursued to trial if negotiations failed.
Modifications would be expected as a response to
stress resulting from continued increases in demand
during periods of over-utilization. Under these con-
ditions similar responses would be expected from
other organizations which, like the court organi-
zation, have little control over inputs or resources.s
During periods of excess capacity expectations
concerning the effects of variations in caseloads are
wholly different. It was mentioned earlier that,
within a given court system the set of procedures
used to process cases, the court's dispositional strat-
egy could be viewed roughly as the result of tension
between internal and external considerations. If
variations in caseload pressure during periods of
excess capacity are viewed from both an external
and internal perspective, a better appreciation of
their role will be obtained. Moreover, the data
exists to conduct a limited test of some of the
relevant expectations.2
The Role of Caseload: External Considerations
If the role of variations in caseloads during pe-
riods of excess capacity is viewed in light of the
court organization's relationship with its environ-
ment, several things become clear. The first is that
2 It should be emphasized that these expectations
differ from those held by traditional researchers in that
their inverses are not expected to hold true. That is,
increases in criminal court resources leading to optimal
utilization of excess capacity would not be expected to
result in the displacement of administrative values by
due process values. When viewed from the organizational
perspective alluded to earlier, the prevalence of admin-
istrative criteria is due to the nature of the power and
interest structures within criminal courts. Mere increases
in resources would do little to affect those structures and
are consequently expected to have only marginal effects
upon the values maximized in the dispositional process.
' One of the presumptions underlying the following
analyses is that, over the period of time studied, the
criminal courts in Chicago enjoyed considerable excess
capacity. No direct proof for this proposition can be
marshalled. But the indirect evidence is considerable.
The January 20, 1974 Chicago Sun-Times finding that
judges spend less than five hours a day in courtroom
activity, which was supported by my own observations,
and the finding that dispositions averaged one per court-
room working day lend strong support to the belief that
the courts were not working to their potential.
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criminal court caseloads are determined by the
court's environment and the court organization has
only marginal control over them. In a loose sense,
different caseload levels are demands for different
levels of service by the community served by the
court system. Increased caseloads are indicative of
an increase either in crime or in the public's pro-
pensity to pursue crimes committed against it.
Whichever the source of the increase, if criminal
courts process their workloads in a manner similar
to that of other organizations, they will not ignore
these environmental considerations. Rather, they
will respond to the increased demands for service
mine whether, in the judge-months examined,
the number of indictments disposed of in a given
judge-months was positively related to the two
caseload variables and the interaction term involv-
ing them. Equation I and Table 3 contain the
results of the data analysis.30 Unlike the previous
analyses, each of the three caseload variables had
a significant, positive impact upon the dependent
variable.3' While changes in caseload pressure did
not appear to affect the way in which cases were
processed, they do appear to result in a higher level
of outputs (i.e., more cases were processed using the
same set of decision rules).
EQUATION I
Y = 28 -. 05 X, -. 003 X2 + .00002 XiX2 (R2 = .16, n = 367)
Where
Y = Number of indictments disposed of in a given judge-month
X, = Number of cases on a judge's docket
X2 - Number of cases pending in criminal trial court system
by increasing outputs. Stated differently, it is ex-
pected that the court organization would respond
in a manner very similar to a private organization.
If such an organization experienced an increase in
demand for its product or service at a time it had
excess productive capacity, it would be expected
simply to increase outputs using the same produc-
tion techniques and procedures it used at lower
levels of output.
This hypothesis can be examined using a set of
aggregate data on Chicago criminal court outputs,
over the same period discussed in the micro-level
analysis (1972-73). Unlike in the micro-level anal-
ysis, where the defendant was the unit of analysis,
in this data set the judge-month is the unit of
analysis. For each of the sixteen judges in the
twenty-four month period of examination, data
were available on each of the two caseload vari-
ables (judge caseload and system caseload), as well
as on a number of aggregate indicators of court
outputs. This analysis, however, will be concerned
with only one output indicator-the total number
of indictments disposed of by each judge in each
month. It has already been established that in
1972-73, the decision rules relating inputs to out-
puts did not appear to vary with changes in case-
load. The question to be addressed now is whether
the court organization responded to increases in
demand for its services by merely increasing out-
puts. Such a response would be expected in times
of increased demand and excess capacity.
Multiple regression analysis was used to deter-
TABLE 3
SUMMARY INFORMATION FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable Bivariate Contribution
Correlation to R2* F Value"
X1 .36 .131 2.7 (32.0)
X2 .26 .014 1.5 (5.8)
XI X2  .39 .010 4.5
* This contribution is based upon variables forced into
the equation in the order reported. The contribution
attributed to X 2 would have been significantly greater if
it were entered first.
** The F values in parentheses are those determined
before the interaction term was entered into the equation.
The Role of Caseloads: Internal Considerations
To process cases in a manner consistent with the
interests of the courtroom elite, various informal
norms reflective of those interests have emerged.
These norms are an integral part of the court's
dispositional strategy. It was quite clear in the
observational phase of this study that an individ-
ual's failure to comply with informal norms in the
'
0 It should be noted that only judge-months involving
full-timejudges working a regular schedule were included
in the analysis. This accounts for the discrepancy between
the expected n of 384 (16 X 24) and the reported n of
367.
sI The coefficients for X, and X2 are negative only
because of the interaction term; their bivariate and net
contribution is positive. The B coefficients for Xi and X2 ,




trial courts of Chicago frequently resulted in some
type of sanctioning. Cases involving recalcitrant
defense attorneys would often be heard near the
end of the daily call; their trials would frequently
be interrupted while the court disposed of other
matters, often stringing them out over several days.
Moreover, uncooperative private defense attorneys
could expect few assignments from judges and even
fewer referrals from clerks or bailiffs. Uncoopera-
tive judges and prosecutors could expect more trials
and problems in obtaining informal discovery of
defendants' cases.
Quantitative analyses also demonstrated the im-
portant role which sanctioning played. The clearest
example was the analysis of sentencing in trial
cases. Cases disposed of by a trial were largely
viewed by courtroom personnel as unsatisfactory
dispositions. Trials usually involved more work and
more uncertainty than guilty pleas. Thus, defend-
ants convicted after a trial were expected to receive
more severe sentences, in similar types of cases,
than defendants pleading guilty. This was empiri-
cally verified. However, many trials were little
more than slow pleas performed to placate uncoop-
erative defendants. Other trials were adversarial
affairs which did much violence to "cordiality
norms" usually prevailing in Chicago trial courts.
Hence it was hypothesized that the greater a de-
fendant's resistance to informal processing, the
The importance of sanctioning in the court's
dispositional strategy is stressed here because it can
shed some light on the role played by caseloads
during periods of excess capacity. It is expected
that, in some instances, sanctioning will be more
severe when caseloads are heavy than when they
are light. The sentencing decision in trial cases can
be used to illustrate and examine this somewhat
general proposition. More specifically, it is ex-
pected that the effect of two of the resistance
indicators upon sentence, the jury trial and legal
motions variables, will vary with caseloads. Even
during periods of excess capacity when the judge
and prosecutor are under enhanced pressure due
to increased caseloads, the problems associated
with the invocation of jury trials and the use of
legal motions are more troublesome. Thus, it is
expected that defendants who resist expeditious
processing would be more severely sanctioned dur-
ing periods when caseloads are high than when
they are low. What is expected, then, is an inter-
active relationship between workloads and the jury
trial and motions variable.
To examine these expectations, the judge case-
load variable, found to be insignificant in the three
micro-level analyses discussed earlier, was tricho-
tomized and two interaction terms were created.33
Equation 2 and Table 4 report the results of the
analysis (R2 = .77, n = 95).
EQUATION 2
Y = 12.6 + .59 X, - 70.8 X2* + 3.0 XIX2 - 33.6 X* + .0007 X4 - 15.5 X, + 41.5 XaX,
Where
Y = Sentence in a trial case
Xi = Seriousness of the first offense
X2 = Type of trial (bench - 0; jury = 1)
X 3 = Number of legal motions (0, 1, 2)
X4 = Delay variable for confined defendants only
Xs = Trichotomous caseload variable
* These B coefficients are negative only because of the presence of the interaction term; the bivariate and net
impact of the variable is positive.
greater his sentence in trial cases. Three resistance
indicators were used to examine this hypothesis:
whether or not the defendant demanded a jury
trial, the number of legal motions his attorney
raised, and evidence of stalling tactics (a delay
variable). Controlling for offense seriousness, each
of these variables was strongly and positively re-
lated to sentence in trial cases. The regression
equation explained seventy-three percent of the
variance in sentence.32
32 For a more complete analysis of sentencing in. trial
cases see P. NARDULLI, supra note 7, ch. VIII.
As is evident, the expectations were partially
realized. While the interaction term involving the
caseloads variable and the jury trial variable was
not significant, the interaction term involving the
caseload variable and the motions variable was,
well beyond the .01 level. Table 5 reports predicted
' Cases sentenced in months when caseloads ranged
from 109 to 239 were scored 1; cases sentenced in months
when caseloads ranged from 240 to 313 were scored 2.
Those higher than 313 were scored 3. This caseload
variable, like the continuous version, had no significant




ESSENTIAL DATA ON THE SECOND TRIAL REGRESSION
ANALYSIS
Approximate
Variable Percentage Beta F
of the Variance Weight Value
Accounted for
XI 30.0 .12 3.5(40.2)'
X2 19.0 -. 19 3.5(34.8)*
X1 X 2  13.0 .61 27.4
X 3  2.0 -. 15 1.1(9.6)*
X4 10.0 .34 31.5
X5 1.0 -. 07 .62(4.6)*
X3X5  2.0 .42 7.0
* Figures in parentheses are F values before the inter-
action term was entered.
ditional thought. Empirical evidence was offered
to support the seminal work of Heumann and
Feeley. It was found that, in Chicago during 1972-
73, variations in caseloads did not affect the guilty
plea decision, the sentence in guilty plea cases, or
the decision to pursue a case to trial. The role of
caseloads was examined from a theoretical perspec-
tive developed more fully in an earlier work. This
examination led to several insights. It was noted,
for example, that the effects of changes in caseloads
may vary depending upon whether the court sys-
tem's resources were over or under utilized. Finally,
some data were used to examine certain expecta-
tions during a period of excess capacity. It was
found that when caseloads increased, outputs in-
TABLE 5
IMPACT OF MOTIONS VARIABLE UPON PREDICTED SENTENCE IN MODAL ARMED ROBBERY CASES ACROSS CATEGORIES OF
THE CASELOAD VARIABLE (IN MONTHS)
Motions Caseload - Low Caseload - Medium Caseload - High
Variable 1 2 0 i 2 0 1 2
Predicted
Armed 129.1 137.1 186.5 113.7 163.1 212.5 98.7 189.5 280.5
Robbery
Sentence
sentences (in a typical armed robbery case involv-
ing a released defendant convicted after a jury
trial) for the three categories of the motions vari-
able in each of the three categories of the caseload
variable. As documented in Table 5, the impact of
the motions variable upon sentence is much greater
when caseloads are high than when they are low.
The predicted differential in sentence due to vari-
ations in the motions variable (between 0 and 2) is
57.4 months when caseloads are low, but 181.8
months when caseloads are high. Thus it appears
that when workloads are more pressing, defendants
are sanctioned more severely for violating cordial-
ity norms.
CONCLUSION
It can be said that traditional views of the role
of criminal court caseloads were inadequate, pri-
marily because of the assumptions underlying tra-
creased, and that sanctions meted out to those
violating informal norms also became more severe.
These results lend support to an emerging view
of criminal courts as organizations. But, just as
important, they shed light on important questions
of criminal justice policy. The results underscore
the arguments made earlier by others: mere in-
creases in criminal court resources will not elimi-
nate the evils long attributed to caseload stress.
The prevalence of administrative considerations in
the operations of most contemporary criminal
courts is not solely due to caseload stress. Rather,
it is rooted in the power and interest structures of
American criminal courts. 
4
" This observation has important implications for the
structure of criminal court reform. However, a discussion
of these implications is beyond the scope of this work. For
a discussion of criminal court reform from the perspective
articulated here see the postscript to P. NARDULLI, supra
note 7.
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